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GRIEVANCE AND ADJUSTMENT BOARD PROCEDURES
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
AS A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO STRIKES
By ASHER W. SCHWARTZt
A S I reviewed the subject of my speech, I noted once again that despite
an improvement over the railroad industry's grievance structure, the
airline industry suffers from an unnecessarily cumbersome, questionably fair
and often frustrating grievance machinery. Something can and should be
done to improve it. The grievances and the people involved with the griev-
ances in the airline industry are basically not different from those in other
industries. Like the railroad industry, the airline industry is unique because
its components operate on a nationwide basis, its agreements are national
in scope, its employees are based at major points across the continent and
overseas and its labor-management relations are under the command or
influence of the Railway Labor Act.1 While in these respects the airline
industry is no different from the railroad industry, it does differ from it in
the area of grievances because there is no National Adjustment Board in
the airline industry.2
I. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The impact of the RLA on airline grievances is of primary importance.
Employees ordinarily define a "grievance" as any employee complaint of
mistreatment by an employer within the status quo.' In many working
agreements, however, grievances are divided between those relating to a
violation of the agreement subject to impartial review and those which stand
or fall at the desk of a vice-president.4 This dichotomy does not exist under
the RLA since sections 3 and 204, which require the airlines and their
employees to "handle" disputes, describe them as "disputes growing out of
grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements con-
cerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Grievances covered by
the Act, as we use the term, therefore, embrace all disputes within the
status quo, not merely those involving the interpretation and application
of agreements.1
t A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard Law School. Formerly Special Assistant to the At-
torney General of the United States; Partner, O'Donnell & Schwartz, New York, N.Y.
'Railway Labor Act, 44 Star. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153, § 184 (1964).
'See Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
I Labor-Management Relations Act, § 8(a) (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1964).
4 Boeing Co. v. International U., United A.A. & A.I. Workers, 231 F. Supp. 930, aff'd, 349
F.2d 412 (1964).
'Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1944). "The second class, how-
ever, contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a sit-
uation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one.
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A second distinctive feature of the RLA is the requirement that all
grievances be finally resolved by arbitration.! The Taft-Hartley Act re-
quires employers to bargain on grievance machinery and requires em-
ployees to process a grievance under the contract grievance procedures.'
However, it does not prescribe a final process for mutually resolving griev-
ances, nor does it require the parties to provide one, ' although many con-
tracts covered by Taft-Hartley will voluntarily provide for the arbitra-
tion of such disputes.
A third aspect of the RLA is that it specifically gives individual em-
ployees the legal right not only to file grievances individually, but also the
right to pursue them to finality with or without union endorsement.9
Taft-Hartley, on the other hand, guarantees the individual employee only
that he may present his grievance independently to his employer, but he
has no right to insist on impartial review. The union has compltte dis-
cretion in this request, subject only to an obligation of fair representation.'0
II. THE BROAD SCOPE OF GRIEVANCE HANDLING
The broad scope of the mandatory grievance procedures required by the
RLA is of special significance to the parties; the most obvious respect being
the enlarged area of potential employee protest and the reduced area of
management free wheeling. Employers are so reluctant to concede that any
aspect of the employment relationship is not completely within their man-
agement prerogative, that even under the RLA, some airline agreements de-
fine the scope of their system boards exclusively in terms of the interpreta-
tion and application of the agreement, as if section 204 did not really mean
what it says. If challenged, such a restriction would fail," for the words of
the Act are clear.
Because the RLA gives such complete coverage in resolving disputes
arising out of both grievances and the interpretation and application of
agreements, the federal courts in 1957 almost revolutionized labor rela-
tions in the airline industry by judicially legislating the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to be inapplicable in connection with "minor disputes."'" The Act's
comprehensive and binding grievance machinery persuaded the courts to
decide that no excuse justifies the disturbance of the tranquility on any air-
The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with refer-
ence to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded upon
some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the col-
lective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim is to rights
accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future." Hornsby v. Dobard, 291 F.2d 483,
486 (1961).
' Walker v. Southern R.R., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966).
'See note 3 supra. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America, 171 F. Supp. 782, 790 (1959),
aff'd, 273 F.2d 614. Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Oil Associates, 290 F.2d 677, 680 (1961).
'Black-Clawson Co. v. I.A.M., 212 F. Supp. 818, 822, aff'd, 313 F.2d 179 (1962).
DElgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 746 (1944). Pacilio v. P.R.R., 381 F.2d
570 (1967).
50Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185, 191 (1967). Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America,
171 F. Supp. 782, 790-91 (1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L.R. 601. (1956).
" See cases cited note 5 supra.
"BRT v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1951).
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line or railroad property resulting from a union dispute or grievance. The
Chicago River"s case informed the industry that the courts would preserve
the peace by force if necessary.
The Supreme Court, however, ignored the fact that at that time the
carriers could obtain judicial review of a board of adjustment decision,
while the unions could not." If the grievant's case was lost before the board,
his remedies were exhausted because he had no right of court review. Yet,
if he won, the carrier could refuse to comply and the grievant then had to
go to court to enforce the award. Thereby, the carrier achieved judicial
review, and the case was tried de novo, with the board's findings as merely
prima facie evidence of the facts. If a money award had been obtained, the
findings were not even prima facie evidence in his favor. This situation
was changed in 1966 by an amendment of section 3, so as to give both
employees and carriers the same right of judicial review, and the court's
function now is restricted solely to deciding whether the board had juris-
diction, whether its proceedings were in compliance with the Act and
whether there was fraud or corruption in its deliberations. In theory,
the Act now grants to employees a fair, effective and peaceful substitute
for the violent and disruptive method of self-help which they could
otherwise employ to settle disputes. Whether this theory is completely
realistic is questionable.
III. AIRLINE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY MOVES SLOWLY
Since the freedom of the parties to resolve their disputes themselves is
prohibited because the Act affords a method of handling grievances which
is an exclusive alternative to self-help, this method should be fair and
fully effective, as well as peaceful. It must also do more than merely
guarantee uninterrupted commerce and continued air traffic, because the
parties, particularly the employees who have the laboring oar and whose
form of self-help is usually more dramatic and provoking than is manage-
ment's, are entitled to complete confidence in the methods and in the
people by whom their claims are resolved. It is questionable whether the
formula of the RLA as applied does as much as it can to reach that result.
Congress is primarily concerned with the public interest. It and the
public are happy so long as the transportation they want is not disturbed
when they want it. The courts also desire a definitive administrative proc-
ess for resolving claims and grievances. Sections 3 and 204 of the Act re-
"aId. at 41, 42. This is made clear by the court's reference to the grievance machinery under
the Railway Labor Act as a "reasonable alternative" to the use of labor's "primary weapon" and to
its contrast of a minor dispute with a major dispute in which " . . . the Railway Labor Act does
not provide a process for a final decision like that of the Adjustment Board in a 'minor dispute'
case." Id. at 42.
'"Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959).
"5Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 80 Stat. 208, 209, 45 U.S.C. 5 113
(1964). This amendment of § 3 is applicable to the airlines. Gordon v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
268 F. Supp. 210 (1967).
Is See Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957) and Westchester Lodge 2186
v. Railway Express Agency, 329 F.2d 748, 753 (1964), holding that if there is no dispute pending
before the adjustment board, the district court has no power to order injunctive relief. Accord,
So. Ry. v. B.L.E., 384 F.2d 323 (1967).
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lieve them of the obligation to pass on the merits of thousands of dis-
putes which otherwise could literally consume them." The airline industry
has informed Congress that it is happy with the Act as it is and as it is
being interpreted and administered in the handling of grievances. 8 The
employee's reaction, on the other hand, can only be described as between
ambivalent and hostile. They and their representatives do not desire to
strike whenever they have a complaint they want remedied. Yet, they do
not like the procedure fostered by the RLA which encourages a timetable
stretching out inordinately, sometimes so much as to make ultimate vic-
tory unimpressive, with no relief in the meantime. To the employees, law
and order is not enough. An honest and real measure of relief in any kind
of dispute requires promptness in its consideration, as well as a fair hearing
on its merits.
IV. THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY PRIOR TO BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT-
THE STEPS
When the RLA was enacted, it either deliberately or inadvertently fol-
lowed a pattern of grievance machinery already devised by railroad car-
riers and national unions representing railroad workers. These parties
had created a formal arrangement of "steps" which varied only in detail
from carrier to carrier. This procedure was described in the following
manner:
Individual employees ordinarily first present their claims to their foremen or
other immediate superiors. If the claims are granted, the case ends; if they are
denied, the employee submits his case to his local union. If the local union
rejects it, the case ends; otherwise, the representative of the local union takes
up the question with the local superintendent of the carrier. If no settlement
is reached, the case goes to the general superintendent, then to the general
manager, and finally to the chief operating oflicer. Cases are customarily pre-
sented to carriers' national unions. The great preponderance of all disputes
that arise are, of course, settled through negotiation at some one of the various
levels of this hierarchy.'
This procedure is still unchanged, as none of the amendments to the Rail-
way Labor Act have had any impact on this pre-board of adjustment
structure.
The airlines either copied or were so influenced by this railroad pattern
that while the titles are different, there is the same obstacle course which
the railroads and railroad unions devised to force proof of the validity of a
grievance as much by endurance as by merit. There is no sense of urgency
or even of readiness to dispose of a grievance until it has been scheduled
"Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 566 (1945); Taylor v. Hudson Rapid
Tube Corp., 362 F.2d 748, 750 (1966).
'a "With reference to the airline industry's experience in the settlement of grievances under
existing collective bargaining agreements, the existing system boards of adjustment procedures, or
variations thereof, have proved and are proving to be satisfactory in achieving the Railway Labor
Act's legislative goal of prompt and orderly disposition of such disputes." J. L. O'Brien, Hearings
on H.R. 701, 704, 706, Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 102 (1965).
19 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE at 8 (February, 1940).
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for some time or has climbed enough "steps" to convince the grievance
Establishment that it insists on a responsive and fair determination. This
step by step procedure is an unfortunate waste of time despite some minor
sifting out of time claims. Once a substantive grievance has been filed
plant level treatment has failed. It really takes only one management
officer, acting by himself or by canvassing the appropriate ruling circles
in management, to determine what is going to be its decision on appeal.
The other officers go through the motions. Also, if the grievant is going
to appeal a decision to an adjustment board, with or without union ap-
proval, he will do it whether he has been turned down once or three or
four times by the same management. However, not all grievances will be
pursued when rejected on appeal. If trivial or hopeless, they will be with-
drawn or abandoned, since cost alone is a substantial factor. In the inter-
est of fair treatment and sound labor policy, all grievances should be dealt
with firmly and quickly, with the elimination of as much surplusage in
procedure as possible and a reduction of the outrageous interval between
the submission of a grievance and management's final answer to it.
V. BI-PARTISAN BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT
When a grievance is not satisfactorily settled at the Superintendent or
Vice-President level and it remains alive, it becomes the problem of a
board of adjustment. Following the pattern of the railroad industry, but
dispensing with a national board, the airlines utilize bi-partisan boards.
It could be argued that because of the framework established by Congress
in setting up the National Railroad Adjustment Board, Congress has in-
dicated an intent that all boards of adjustment be bi-partisan as well as
multi-membered. This is not necessarily so. In my judgment they are
inappropriate and obsolete. Since the bi-partisan board does not lend
itself to the expeditious handling of grievances, it should be discarded.
We should remember that the board of adjustment structure must be
treated with greater caution than any of the earlier steps of the griev-
ance procedure, because the board has the power to make judicially en-
forceable and non-reviewable, final and binding decisions."° Bi-partisan-
ship has its place in a legislative process, whether it is to enact statutes or
reach agreements; but it does not fit the judicial process, which has become
the board's sole function. It no longer "adjusts" disputes, rather it de-
cides them.
When awards of boards of adjustment against grievants were not re-
viewed by the courts, but those in favor of grievants which the carrier
refused to obey were so reviewed with a de novo consideration of the merits
of the grievance, the union's view of relief through the courts was neces-
sarily dim. The unions were more inclined to rely on a traditionally more
useful sanction, such as a strike, slowdown or a threat of either. This en-
couraged "adjustment." In 1957, this method was changed by the Chicago
[Vol. 35s
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River case and, in 1966, by amendment of the Railway Labor Act. 1 The
union's strike sanction was now frustrated by the threat of injunction,
and the awards of adjustment boards became realistically enforceable in
the courts. The boards are now truly quasi-judicial agencies with tre-
mendous authority over carriers and their employees.
The Air Transport Association has found that the time required for
the processing of a grievance before adjustment boards varied from four
to twelve months.2 This is an extraordinary lapse of time after "the steps"
in which to dispose of the usual grievance. The arrangement of meetings
at which four members of the board, the grievant, union and carrier rep-
resentatives and sometimes their counsel must be present is not accom-
plished easily. A multi-member board also requires one or more executive
sessions; meetings must be arranged well in advance; and in the event of a
deadlock, this procedure must be repeated with the added complication of
the time availability of the neutral.
There are other problems also. There is usually one board for the entire
system covering a craft and class. This system almost always involves a
number of domiciles or stations far removed from the home office at
which the board functions, thus adding the burdens of cost of travel and
increased consumption of time. The board's cases are generally put on the
calendar and taken up in chronological order, without regard to the critical
importance of the case. One can almost say that delay is of the essence in
a bi-partisan board of adjustment structure.
VI. EXPERTISE OF BOARD MEMBERS
It cannot be said that the presence of representatives of the parties on
the board of adjustment adds substantially to the fairness or soundness of
its product. In defense of the bi-partisan board, it is argued that the party-
appointed members make a contribution in their knowledge of facts and
practices relating to the grievance which is not necessarily reflected in
the record. That is, they add "expertise." ' This contribution which board
members may make in executive session has always disturbed me. When a
case is presented at an open hearing, particularly with the participation of
counsel, it would seem appropriate for the decision to rest upon the record
as it was made at the hearing. One can never be sure that this will be so
if the board's members add a supplement. Therefore, the neutral's under-
standing of the case and his decision may be based on evidence and points
made in executive session which counsel has no opportunity to refute or
clarify. Participation of counsel will occur only if the neutral thinks
clarification or comment by counsel is appropriate, and since another hear-
ing must be called and all the parties must once again be present, it is
likely that the partisan board members will have the last word on the
contentions of the parties.
21 See note 12 supra. Railway Labor Act, 44 Star. 578 (1926), as amended, 80 Stat. 208, 209,
45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
2"As for the time which is required in the airline industry to process cases before adjustment
boards, we do not have precise figures. However, our overall experience indicates that most cases
are concluded within 4 to 12 months." Hearings on H.R. 701, 704, 706, supra. Note 18, at 101.
" United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 .(1960).
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Board members other than the neutral are often amateurs as board mem-
bers, although professionals as operating officials or employees. In some
cases, unions keep the same board members for long periods of time, while
in other cases they change frequently. The practice of some boards, in
permitting counsel rather than a member of the bargaining unit or an
officer of the carrier to sit, is a clear clue that the board's executive sessions
are likely to be a de novo hearing without the presence of the parties. The
desired end result can be achieved more expeditiously, economically and
fairly by a simple, concisely stated appeal to a single neutral who in most
cases determines the issue in the same way that he would if he had a board
of which to be considerate but to which to be oblivious, in arriving at his
decision.
VII. THE BI-PARTISAN BOARD Is NOT IMPARTIAO
The employment of an adjustment board dominated by partisans was
a deliberate choice of the railroads and railroad unions. They were not keen
about independent, outside influence. The Attorney General's Committee
described the Board in the following manner:
The National Railroad Adjustment Board presents the opportunity to ob-
serve a hi-partisan system in operation. The Board's thirty-six members are
not government employees, and they are frankly partisan in favor of their
principals. They are more like advocates than judges, for their primary inter-
est seems to be winning cases, not soundly deciding them. They find facts
through the use of hearsay, without witnesses and without oaths or cross-
examination. Yet only about one decision in every thousand is judicially
reviewed. And the parties seem to be fairly well satisfied with the system."
This description hardly fits an adjudicating agency as we understand it.
Today, the board of adjustment adjudicates rather than adjusts. Its scope
is broad and its jurisdiction exclusive,26 and the courts are not available
either to grievant or carrier to review its decisions. Its judgment is not
subject to question."
In recent years, Congress and the courts have vested unions with broad
authority and responsibility in the negotiation and enforcement of agree-
ments and handling of grievances. Attempts by employees to by-pass the
union in matters affecting rates of pay, rules and working conditions have
been frustrated and rejected, with good reason.' Instead, the courts have
formulated a duty of fair representation to protect employees from union
failure to exercise that authority and responsibility in behalf of a grievant.'M
A serious question arises at this point as to whether this duty also applies
to union appointed members on the board of adjustment. What duty of
fair representation do they have and how is any duty of representation in
24Arnold v. United Airlines, 296 F.2d 191 (1961).
25 RESEARCH REPORT, THE 1940 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE at 1.
2Dominguez v. National Airlines, 279 F. Supp. 392, 394 (1968).
27 Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1967).
21 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
29Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Brady v. TWA, 401 F.2d 87, 94 (1968).
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an adversary proceeding consistent with the common provision in airline
agreements that all board members will be entitled to exercise their judg-
ment independently of the interest of the parties? When union appointed
board members decide against a grievant, or contribute votes to out-vote
a neutral who favors his grievance, will they be held for a violation of
the duty of fair representation?
Arnold v. United Airlines,' presents a typical case of a possible am-
biguity of interest between grievant and union board members. Thirty-
four pilots who had been flight engineers filed a grievance asserting that
they were not given proper seniority positions as pilots because their service
as flight engineers had been ignored. They had gone to court in lieu of
presenting a grievance to the adjustment board. The court dismissed their
petition because only the adjustment board had jurisdiction. However, by
the time they filed with the adjustment board, there was a question of
time limitation, and adjustment board ruled against them. What is interest-
ing in the context of this discussion is the court's response to the grievant's
complaint about the make-up of the board.
The board is bi-partisan rather than impartial and disinterested. . . . The
chairman was a representative of United. His participation on United's behalf
in the prior litigation made him no more or less partial than any other person
identified with United's interest would have been. It was not a disqualification.
Nor does the record show that the two ALPA members of the four member
board, through their identification with ALPA, were 'hostile' within the mean-
ing of Edwards v. Capital Airlines (1949), 176 F.2d 755. In that case the
union aggressively opposed the position of the grievants who were non-
members .. .1
In the Edwards case,3 two pilots who had entered the armed forces were
reinstated with seniority dating back to the time of their original employ-
ment. Upon objection by a large number of pilots, the matter eventually
was referred to a system board with no referee. The board ruled that the
seniority of the two pilots related back only to the date they returned to
the airline. The company complied with the award, and the two pilots
appealed to the court. A United States district court refused to review
the award, but a court of appeals did review and said, among other things:
If the union were neutral in the dispute, that would be one thing. But where
the union is aggressively presenting the interests of one group of employees
and the company has no stake in the outcome, impartiality, protective of the
rights of a non-member minority, could hardly be conclusively presumed."
In P.R.R. v. Rychlik " Justice Frankfurter said of this subject:
The short of it is that since every railroad employee is represented by union
agents who sit on a System Board of Adjustment, such representatives are in
what amounts to a fiduciary position: they must not exercise their power
in an arbitrary way against some minority interest. The fact of a general
30296 F.2d 191 (1961).
81 Id. at 195.
"Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F.2d 755 (1949).
33id. at 760.
34352 U.S. 480 (1949).
1969]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
conflict of interest between a minority of union members and representatives
designated by the majority does not of itself vitiate the pre-supposition of
self-government and does not of itself subject the System Board action to
judicial review. Conflict between a majority and a minority is common-
place in the whole collective bargaining process. But the bargaining repre-
sentatives owe a judicially enforceable duty of fairness to all the components
of the working force when a specific claim is in controversy."
The Supreme Court has also said what all of us would assume. "A fair
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.""6 My own
position is that the union view of a minority interest as well as the carrier's
view is prone to be unfriendly if not hostile, and an open, adverse union
position should not be required to challenge the fairness of a board whose
members are solely or predominantly appointed by the carrier and the
union.
VIII. INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO GRIEVE
A third feature of the RLA's requirements on grievances is the right of
an individual to file a grievance and to pursue it to a board of adjust-
ment." Presumably, an individual's efforts are likely to be less effective
because the union's representatives normally have greater skill in presenting
grievances; the union's presence lends the grievance a certain prestige; the
union's absence raises a question or suspicion as to the merit of the griev-
ance; and finally, the grievance will ultimately be resolved by a board
composed partially of union representatives whose votes may be decisive.
Nevertheless, the individual can, if he chooses, press his point individually
to a conclusion. An individual or group of employees may file a grievance
and settle it while others in similar situations are unaware of the filing or
of its settlement. This procedure is a problem for the airlines because of
the geographically widespread character of airline operations. Employees
and the union representatives at one domicile may be unaware of what
is being done at another, despite the fact that one agreement with one union
party, generally the International union, governs them all. The domiciles
are large enough to have separate locals and different union officers re-
sponsible for applying the grievance machinery locally. The problem does
not exist, to my knowledge, as much among the flight crew members as
among the larger ground crew units. It has always seemed strange that on
the railroads the division superintendents are out of touch with grievance
decisions from their divisions, while the organizations are aware of all of
them. However, in the airlines, the reverse is true. 'W'hile the airline car-
riers' hot lines work well, the unions have none, and for this neglect, they
can only blame themselves.
However, few grievances are filed without the union's aid. Despite
this factor, as a general practice in the airline industry, all grievances
are signed and submitted by an individual employee, even though the
'51d. at 498-99.
"
6 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954).
s"Slagley v. Illinois Central R.R., 397 F.2d 546, 551 (1968).
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matter involves all or many employees and the union presses them.
Except on the basis of history and precedent, I have never received
an explanation as to why this practice exists. It may rest on a misapplica-
tion of Elgin, ]. &q E. Ry. Co. v. Burley' in which a settlement of some
time claims by the union was held not binding because it was not proved
that the claimants had authorized the Brotherhood to represent them indi-
vidually in the board's proceeding. The Court indicated that the union's
constitution could give the union the right to settle all members' griev-
ances. I would think that such a right would be implied out of the union's
status as the accredited representative because no harm is done to an indi-
vidual so long as his own right to grieve is left untouched. The requirement
that all grievances be submitted by an employee rather than by the union
is archaic. My suggestion of negotiations for a change in this respect has
almost always been rejected as there is never enough interest in the
mechanics of the grievance procedure on the part of employees to make
any phase of it a strike issue. For this reason, its form is almost always the
product of management preference.
The Court's view in the Elgin case as to the responsibility and authority
of the union to act for its members has been modified considerably since
1944. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,"' the Supreme Court said that
an employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.
"Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such activity
complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative by
permitting it to participate actively in the continuing administration of the
contract."'
In Vaca v. Sipes" the Court majority said:
The collective bargaining system as encouraged by the NLRB of necessity
subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests
of all employees in a bargaining unit.'
The trend away from recognizing the right of individuals to act inde-
pendently of their union, and its corollary which relies primarily on the
union's right to handle all grievances, is accompanied by an expression of
the obligation of the union to represent its members fairly and without
discrimination. This concept is not new to the RLA. The Steele, Howard4
and smiliar cases already had enforced this obligation of the union to deal
with the people they represent fairly. The early cases were concerned
basically with unfairness arising out of racial discrimination. Today, the
duty of fair representation goes beyond this type of discrimination. The
case of Vaca v. Sipes," decided in 1967, is the most recent major contribu-
tion to this area of the law. In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry,' the
38325 U.S. 711 (1944).
"9379 U.S. 650 (1965).
40id. at 653.
4'386 U.S. 171 (1967).
4Id. at 182-83. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
4
BRT v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
44386 U.S. 171 (1967).
45393 U.S. 324 (1969).
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Supreme Court applied the principle of Vaca v. Sipes to a grievance under
the RLA. The employees had the right to employ the grievance machinery
on their behalf, but the Court stated that its employment in this case would
be futile since it meant the submission of their claim to a board which
was chosen by the union and carrier against whom the grievants were
complaining. It also held that in cases involving a breach of duty of fair
representation, the employer may be joined to afford full relief to the com-
plaint. Thus, the rights of an individual employee are presumably pro-
tected-whether the union pursues the claim or merely judges it.
No union or carrier can guarantee to each employee that his grievance
will be settled correctly. They both have an obligation under the Act,
however, to afford him an unquestionably fair, impartial and objective
review of his grievance, and a decision must be based solely on the claim's
merits. This right, the bi-partisan board does not guarantee.
IX. SELF-HELP
In the parlance of labor-management relations, a strike is referred to
as self-help by the union. An employer's announcement of a unilateral
change in rates of pay, rules or working conditions is also self-help. Under
certain conditions, in major disputes, self-help is legally available to either
the union or the employer. The only form of self-help which a union or
employee can apply against management is to stop work. The carrier, how-
ever, has a broader potential for self-help, since it acts unilaterally in the
management of its business and in giving orders to its employees, i.e., it
initiates decisions affecting working conditions and the payment of wages.
Since the Chicago River case, the carrier has a remedy against the union's
resort to self-help in grievance matters in the form of a restraining order
or temporary injunction. The effect of such an order is felt immediately,
as there are no "steps," and no problem about selecting neutrals. More-
over, scheduling of hearings is quick and simple, and since relief is imme-
diate, the decision is enforceable by fine or imprisonment. The union's
remedy, however, is restricted to filing a grievance. The adjustment board
has no power to enjoin, and the objectionable conduct of the carrier con-
tinues until the grievance steps and board proceedings are completed.
The employee wants to know why his employer cannot be restrained
pending the grievance proceedings. It seems to him that management's
self-help is presumed to be lawful until decided otherwise by a board
of adjustment, while his union's resort to self-help is always unlawful.
Whatever the rationalization for this difference of treatment, it is
clearly discriminatory. The employees fail to understand why the car-
rier's wrongful conduct should be allowed to continue when theirs will
not, no matter how right they may eventually prove to be in their griev-
ance. The usual answer is that whatever wrong is being committed by the
carrier can and will be remedied by an award of money damages, inasmuch
as it is not irreparable. The damage to the carrier by a work stoppage in
the transportation industry, on the other hand, is irreparable. While this
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answer, regardless of its validity, appeals to the disinterested, the public
and the carrier, it is not especially appealing to the employees. A money
award is not always available nor is it necessarily a complete or satisfactory
form of relief for the damage done. This fact is particularly true in dis-
putes involving assignments of work and relocation of employees; it may
also be true in discharge cases, if prolonged. An assignment of work or
relocation dispute, for example, involves no claim of pay by employees
who are required to work at a burdensome or objectionable assignment or
at a new location which they claim is unlawful as to them but at which
their rates of pay are the same as if they were properly assigned.
If a dispute is labeled a "major" dispute because the carrier is changing
the agreement rather than violating it, the status quo provisions in the
RLA would be applicable and enforcable by injunction." In most situa-
tions, however, it is difficult to distinguish between a major and a minor
dispute. If the union seeks a change in a working condition, it must file a
section 6 notice at an appropriate time, which may be many months after
it believes the change to be necessary or desirable, and it must maintain
the status quo-no change-until all the procedures of the Act have been
completed, which may require a year or even longer.
If the carrier decides to modify an operation which changes a working
condition, it has the power to do so immediately. If the union complains
of the effect on working conditions because it represents something new
or different, the carrier's answer is either that it has the right to make the
change under the agreement or that there is nothing in the agreement which
prevents it from so doing. If the union disagrees, then there is merely a
dispute as to the interpretation of the agreement which is a minor dispute,
and the union's sole remedy is the filing of a grievance. Pending resolution
of the dispute, the change stays in effect. I have insufficient time to ex-
plore the problem further, but it is important because it can mean a
court's refusal to use its injunctive power to maintain the status quo when
it might otherwise do so.
X. TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS
The courts fill a policing role in the administration of the grievance
machinery. As we have seen, if the employees do not accept the concept
of exhausting the grievance machinery to rectify the carrier's employment
of self-help and they decide to use their own self-help, the courts will en-
join them and order compliance with the grievance machinery without
deciding the merits of the dispute. However, the court's attention can be
drawn to both the equities involved and the merits by requesting that the
court attach conditions to the issuance of the injunction, the usual condi-
tion being that the status quo ante, with emphasis on the "ante," be main-
tained pending resolution of the dispute through the grievance machinery.
If successful, the union will have thwarted the carrier's exercise of its
" Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156, 160 (1964).
American Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777, 787 (1958).
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prerogative of self-help until a decision is reached by a board of adjust-
ment. Carriers always insist that the court has no jurisdiction to order a
maintenance of the status quo ante in a minor dispute, the argument be-
ing that the RLA provides for it only in a major dispute. There is now no
question that the court does have such jurisdiction. Moreover, the courts
have exercised it."'
Thus, if the employees want a status quo ante pending the grinding
away of the grievance machinery, they must first strike, or at the least
threaten strike. Clearly a court can issue an injunction requiring a carrier
to maintain the status quo ante in a minor dispute without a strike or
threatened strike. Westchester Lodged involved transfers and layoffs be-
cause of the closing of a railroad terminal and a transfer to different
seniority districts. The appellate court did not issue an injunction; rather,
it directed the district court to do so if the dispute were properly referred
to the adjustment board and equity required issuance, even though there
was no strike or strike threat. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
said:
Nor do we find anything in the Railway Labor Act which prohibits a
federal court from issuing an injunction to restore the status quo in a minor
dispute if the court's discretion is soundly exercised to preserve the primary
jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire
& Eng. v. Southern Ry. Co., 217 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1963). The Adjust-
ment Board normally requires several years to render a decision. See Note,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1962). This lengthy delay may encourage
voluntary settlement of disputes, but where, as here, relocation and jobs are
involved, a victory before the Adjustment Board might well prove Pyrrhic,
even though back wages might be collected from the carrier. Of course, if
required to retain the status quo for three to five years, a carrier successful
before the Board stands little chance of being reimbursed by the union for
unnecessary expenditures. A court might resolve this dilemma by conditioning
its injunction on the union guaranteeing to indemnify the carrier if the
carrier prevails before the Board. See Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 426
(1962). In any event, "the balancing of these competing claims of irrepar-
able hardship is . . . the traditional function of the equity court, the exercise
of which is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion." Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers v. Missouri K.T.R. Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 535, 80 S. Ct.
at 1330, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1435. 41
In my experience, it has been difficult to persuade a district judge that
an injunction is appropriate or even that conditions exist requiring a car-
rier to maintain the status quo in a minor dispute. The courts are reluctant
to interfere with management's administration of its affairs or to overlap
the jurisdiction of the adjustment board, and are therefore, inclined to
look upon the irreparable aspects of a grievance as trivial when compared
with these considerations, particularly if a claim for money is also involved.
If, however, the thesis of the Chicago River case is true, in that the
stautory grievance machinery is so reasonable an alternative to the griev-
4 7 Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
48Westchester Lodge 2186 v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 329 F.2d 748 (1964).
4 Id. at 753.
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ant's right and power of strike that jurisdiction to issue injunctions in a
labor dispute may be asserted, Norris-LaGuardia notwithstanding, it would
be equally appropriate for courts to fill the gap if delay in affording relief
to the grievant makes the grievance machinery an inadequate alternative.
The court should grant conditions to the issuance of an injunction on an
equitable basis as readily as they issue orders to enjoin strikes. To afford
real equity, the courts should assume the burden of determining what dam-
ages are suffered by delay in granting relief to the grievant. Whatever
may be the cost to the carrier, because of the ultimate dismissal of the
grievance, it is only part of the whole cost of the dispute. The awesome
remedy of injunction which the carrier has invoked contributes to the
cost. It should not be borne solely by the employees whose grievances must
wait for "the steps" and the boards unless frivolous contentions or delay-
ing tactics by the employees exist. If the courts generally accept such a
philosophy, I think we would see a genuine and general interest in mod-
ernizing, expediting and humanizing the grievance machinery in the air-
line industry.
